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Abstract1
 
 
Dealing with the arguable failure in preserving going-concern value, the reforms of the Spanish Bankruptcy 
Act have promoted a certain kind of out-of-court workouts as a prior step or even as an alternative to 
bankruptcy (the “Legally Enhanced Workouts). Perhaps oddly, while bankruptcy petitions increased, this sort 
of legally fostered out-of-court workouts decreased between 2009 and 2011. Statistics moreover suggest that 
going-concern companies drew on “unprotected” out-of-court workouts instead of filing the petition, which is 
still compulsory. This paper argues empirically, through the lens of lawyers, the reasons why distressed 
companies may disregard the legal incentives akin to the Legally Enhanced Workouts.  
 
While strongly grounded on the economic analysis of corporate and insolvency law, the research work is 
empirical. It attempts to bring an alternative view to discuss the convenience of “importing” foreign best 
practices in accordance with the law and society approach. Practitioners are thus most likely familiar with the 
discussion. The paper is updated to the most recent reforms of Spanish law, while the empirical analysis is 
restrained to the data available until April 2013 (the date of the last interview). Hence, the research work is 
concerned with the statistics of 2011. Further empirical research may analyze the impact of the most recent 
reforms as per the data available for years 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016. 
 
Título: ¿Son realmente tan atractivos los acuerdos de refinanciación protegidos frente al concurso? 
 
Keywords: out-of-court workout, fresh-money, claw-back, automatic stay, cramdown, transaction costs 
Palabras clave: acuerdo de refinanciación, dinero nuevo, reintegración, paralización de acciones, extensión de efectos, 
costes de transacción  
                                                        
1 I am particularly thankful to Professor George G. TRIANTIS for his time and sound advice in supervising this research 
work. I also highly appreciate useful comments at different stages of this paper from Professor G. MARCUS COLE. I 
would like to thank as well the continuous advice of Professor José Antonio GARCÍA-CRUCES and Professor Vicente 
SALAS. Comments from Professor Esteban F. VAN HEMMEN have been very useful as well. In addition, this research 
work would not have been possible without the interviewees’ time. Despite their tight schedules, all of them showed 
great interest and willingness to participate in the project. Their significant point of view as leading practitioners is 
highly appreciated. Finally, there are no words to express my gratitude to the SPILS community at Stanford 
University School of Law. A particular note goes to Professor Lawrence M. FRIEDMAN, Professor Deborah R. HENSLER, 
and my dear teaching fellow, Sergio PUIG. I would also like to thank my SPILS fellows for their friendship, support, 
and advice during this time. It is true. The Stanford Program in International Legal Studies (SPILS) is something special 
that goes far beyond an unmatched academic experience in paradise. Hence, my last acknowledgment goes to Dr. 
Alejandro PAYÁ, former SPILS fellow and colleague, who encouraged that I apply to it, Professor Fernando CERDÁ, 
and the late Professor Emilio BELTRÁN. All of them supported my application along with Professor GARCÍA-CRUCES. 
Needless to say, I am exclusively responsible for all the mistakes and inaccuracies. 
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1. Introduction2
 
 
The reforms of the Spanish Bankruptcy Act3 foster the negotiation and conclusion of certain out-of-
court workouts (the “Legally Enhanced Workouts”) as a prior step or, under certain conditions, even 
as an alternative to bankruptcy, which has arguably failed to preserve “going-concern value”4. An 
out-of-court workout is a contract entered into between a company and its creditors to remove 
insolvency by restructuring the debtor’s capital structure5, so that an economically viable company 
may continue to run its potentially profitable business in the market6
 
.  
The reforms 7  enhance the negotiations aimed at concluding Legally Enhanced Workouts and 
furthermore endeavor to address the concerns of debtors and creditors in case of subsequent 
bankruptcy. First, these schemes ease insolvent debtor’s legal duty to file for bankruptcy8. Debtor’s 
communication to the court 9
                                                        
2 Although the paper is updated to the last reforms of Spanish law, the empirical analysis is restrained to the data 
available until April 2013 (the date of the last interview). Hence, the research work is concerned with the statistics of 
2011. Further empirical research may analyze the impact of the most recent reforms as per the data available for years 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016. 
 about the beginning of negotiations aimed at reaching a Legally 
Enhanced Workout or a pre-packaged composition agreement triggers a four month suspension 
 
3 Spanish Act 22/2003 of July 9, 2003, of Bankruptcy (the “SBA”). 
 
4 Bankruptcy preserves going-concern value, arising out of synergies or profitable executory contracts, for instance, if 
it enables a financially troubled but economically viable company to reach a more efficient capital structure in order 
to keep on operating in the market. See Barry E. ADLER, Douglas G. BAIRD & Thomas H. JACKSON (2007, pages 23-29). 
 
5 Capital structure is used in the United States of America in the same sense as “estructura de pasivo” in Spain. 
 
6 See articles 71 bis and 231-242, as well as the additional provision fourth of the SBA. 
 
7 These reforms stem from the Royal Decree-law 3/2009 of March 27, 2009, on urgent tax, financial, and insolvency 
law measures in view of the unfolding economic situation, the acts 38/2011 of October 10, 2011, on partial reform of 
the SBA, and 14/2013, of September 27, on Support of Entrepreneurs (the “Act on Support of Entrepreneurs”), and 
the Royal Decree-law 4/2014, of March 7, on urgent measures concerning the refinancing and the restructuring of 
corporate debt (the “Royal Decree-law 4/2014”). 
 
8 Under article 165 of the SBA, lack of compliance with this legal duty entails a rebuttable presumption of willful or 
grossly negligent behavior in generating or deepening debtor’s insolvency, which may give rise to liability for the 
impaired claims if bankruptcy is classified as guilty (see article 172 bis of the SBA). The debtor is only entitled to file 
such a communication once a year. Significantly, other out-of-court workouts, those which not gather all the 
requirements of the Legally Enhanced Workouts, are deprived of this protection notwithstanding whether or not their 
conclusion may remove debtor’s insolvency.  
 
9 See articles 5 and 5 bis of the SBA. Concerning the so-called “out-of-court arrangement of payments” (acuerdo 
extrajudicial de pagos), the debtor requests the appointment of a mediator to the Commercial Registray or to a Notary, 
who in turn communicates the beginning of negotiations to the court upon such appointment (see articles 232 and 233 
of the SBA). 
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period of that duty 10 . As a result, holding-out creditors are deprived from filing mandatory 
bankruptcy petitions within this period of time11. Second, the onset of negotiations may also bring 
about a sort of pre-petition automatic stay of certain enforcement actions 12. Third, the Legally 
Enhanced Workouts are provided with claw-back protection in subsequent bankruptcy. The degree 
of protection varies depending on the kind of Legally Enhanced Workout13                                                        
10 However, the debtor does not have to be insolvent in order to file this communication, unless the Legally Enhanced 
Workout at hand is an out-of-court arrangement of payments (see articles 5 bis and 231 of the SBA).  
. Fourth, the out-of-court 
 
11 Although this may be of the majority of creditors’ interest, the debtor remains the sole stakeholder with standing to 
file this communication. 
 
12 The communication to suspend debtor’s legal duty to petition bankruptcy automatically forestalls the filing of in-
court enforcement actions and suspends those already initiated that aim at assets necessary in order to run the 
debtor’s business activity. However, it does not affect public claims. This automatic stay may also thwart both in-
court and out-of-court enforcement actions sought by creditors with financial claims that aim at any good of the 
debtor. This requires a majority of 51 percent of the financial creditors (see article 5 bis and additional section fourth 
of the SBA). A financial creditor is a creditor who holds one of the claims set forth in section ninth of the general 
accounting plan approved by the royal decree 1514/2007, of November 16 [see (YÁÑEZ & NIETO (2014, page 27)]. In 
any event, however, the automatic stay does not concern actions seeking declaratory relief or setoff. Creditors holding 
public claims also escape from the automatic stay. Concerning out-of-court arrangement of payments, there is also an 
automatic stay as to enforcement actions. Yet, it does not affect creditors holding public claims or secured creditors 
(see articles 231 and 235 of the SBA). 
 
13 Court-sanctioned out-of-court workouts pursuant to the additional section fourth of the Spanish Bankruptcy Act 
enjoy the highest degree of protection against claw-back. This only requires a majority of creditors holding 51 percent 
of the debtor financial claims (the claims held by the debtor’s specially related persons do not count towards this 
majority). The trustee may only seek avoidance drawing on the more restraining general private law actions (see 
article 71.6 of the SBA and articles 1111, and 1290-1299 of the Spanish Civil Code). 
 
Under article 71 bis 1 of the SBA, creditors representing at least 60 percent of debtor’s claims must consent to an out-
of-court workout, which must entail a significant enlargement of debtor’s credit or a change in the capital structure by 
either granting a longer term or replacing previous claims with new ones. This majority must be certified by an 
auditor. In the case of a group a companies, the majority refers both individually to each company and to the group as 
a whole (where the intercompany claims are not taken into account). This scheme must be granted before a Notary. 
The Royal Decree-law 4/2014 has removed the obligation of having an expert appointed to assess (i) the sufficiency of 
the information provided by the debtor, (ii) the reasonableness and attainability of a short-term or medium-term 
business plan, and (iii) the proportionality of the new security interests according to current market conditions. 
However, the debtor or the creditors may request such appointment, in which case they bear the risk of any 
qualification. All in all, the report of an independent expert is still compulsory as to the exemption to launch 
mandatory takeover bids following a debt-for-equity swap under article 8(d) of the Royal Decree 1066/2007, of July 
27, on takeover bids. Likewise, this report allows creditors to argue the reasonability of a debt-for-equity swap in 
order to handle financial distress, which may give rise to liability of directors and even the shareholders who not vote 
in favor of such corporate decision that is consequently thwarted (see articles 165.4º, 172.2.1º, and 172 bis 1 of the 
SBA). Only the bankruptcy trustee has standing to seek avoidance of a Legally Enhanced Workout under article 71 bis 
1 of the SBA, either on the grounds of lack of any of the foresaid requirements or in merits of general actions under 
the Spanish Civil Code. All in all, the declaration that any requirement is missing should not bring about claw-back 
automatically. The trustee must prove why the workout is detrimental to the estate or, according to the Spanish 
Supreme Court, whether it surpasses the equal protection of creditors from the same class. 
 
Article 71 bis 2 of the SBA also provides claw-back protection to other out-of-court workouts that fail to gather the 
majority of 60 percent of debtor’s claims. Only the bankruptcy trustee has standing to seek claw-back of any of such 
Legally Enhanced Workouts on the grounds that any of the following requirements is missing: (i) increase of the 
assets-to-liabilities ratio; (ii) non-negative working capital; (iii) the resulting value of the security interests not to 
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workout may be crammed down over dissenting creditors holding financial claims14. Last but not 
least, prepetition new money resulting from the conclusion of a Legally Enhanced Workout earns a 
preferential treatment in subsequent bankruptcy15, provided that creditors (non-related persons to 
the debtor) grant it16
 
.  
Perhaps strikingly, the number of bankruptcy proceedings increased between 2009 and 2011, while 
the Legally Enhanced Workouts were used decreasingly. This might be at odds with the official 
statistics showing that the petition is normally delayed until the debtor has failed both financially 
and economically. Other sources of information suggest though that distressed companies drew 
indeed on “unprotected” out-of-court workouts instead of filing bankruptcy petitions.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
exceed 9/10 of the debt (the loan-to-value ratio must neither decrease as a result of the workout); (iv) the resulting 
interest rate not to exceed more than 1/3 of the former one; and (v) the workout to be granted before a notary public, 
having the parties to represent the economic reasons that justify the out-of-court workout instead of filing for 
bankruptcy. In addition, the trustee has standing to seek avoidance in merits of the general actions under the Spanish 
Civil Code. Again, the declaration that any requirement is missing should not encompass claw-back automatically. 
 
Last but not least, unprotected out-of-workouts should not be automatically avoided since the trustee must prove the 
existence of prejudice. According to the Spanish Supreme Court (see below), the court must also consider whether or 
not the prejudice has enough consideration as a result of the workout. However, it remains to be seen whether or not 
Spanish judges turn to a sort of probatio diabolica (see below). 
 
14 Creditors holding 60 percent of the financial claims may cramdown the workout over dissenting creditors who hold 
unsecured financial claims. This cramdown includes stays of payments up to five years and the conversion of their 
claims into participative loans for five years. A majority of 75 percent enables to cramdown stays of payment up to 10 
years, discharges, debt-for-equity and debt-for-asset swaps, as well as conversion of their claims into participative 
loans for 10 years, other subordinated or otherwise new debt instruments, or convertible securities. The same 
cramdown may affect also secured financial claims with a majority of 65 percent or 80 percent of the secured financial 
claims, respectively (see additional section fourth of the SBA). Significantly, the last reforms have extended the 
cramdown from financial entities to creditors holding financial claims, which shall enable to eliminate certain 
greenmailing strategies in the distressed claims market. See De CÁRDENAS y GARCÍA (2013). Concerning out-of-court 
arrangement of payments, a majority of 60 percent of non-public and unsecured claims is required in order to 
cramdown the scheme over the dissenting creditors (see article 238 of the SBA). By the same token, it does not affect 
public creditors (unless they consent to it) or secured creditors (in which case their claim does count toward the 60 
percent majority). 
 
15 Fifty percent of prepetition fresh money has the priority of an administrative expense. The remaining 50 percent has 
a general privilege that ranks after security interests but over unsecured creditors (see articles 84 and 91 of the SBA). 
However, the Royal Decree-law 4/2014, of March 7, provides an administrative expense priority to the whole amount 
of the new money for two years (until March 7, 2016), notwithstanding who the lender is. Questionably, new money 
granted as a provision of an unprotected out-of-court workout does not enjoy this privilege.  
 
16 Nevertheless, the Royal Decree-law 4/2014, of March 7, sets forth that creditors becoming shareholders following a 
debt-for-equity swap as a result of the Legally Enhanced Workouts shall not be considered debtor’s specially related 
persons. This shall avoid subordination of the claim akin to new money granted in merits of such workout following 
the debt-for-equity swap. See article 92.5 of the SBA. 
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This paper argues empirically, through the lens of lawyers, the reasons why distressed companies 
would turn to “unprotected” out-of-court workouts at the expense of the legal incentives akin to the 
Legally Enhanced Workouts. Relying on snowballing and semi-structured qualitative interviews 
addressed to leading finance, restructuring, and bankruptcy lawyers in Madrid 17
 
, this paper 
contends that the reactiveness of the SBA’s 2009 and 2011 reforms has arguably prompted a 
mismatch between Spanish branches’ legislative actions and certain judicially crafted achievements, 
namely the “unjustified estate’s sacrifice” doctrine. This delay has arguably made the Legally 
Enhanced Workouts more “expensive” than “unprotected” out-of-court workouts in relative terms. 
The inflexibility in the appointment procedure and independent experts’ lack of legal expertise may 
also outweigh the advantages of turning to a Legally Enhanced Workout. In particular, independent 
experts’ qualifications underscore the concerns about the possibility of seeking declaratory relief to 
challenge the “legal shield.” On the other hand, concerns about past strategic behavior regarding 
banks’ accounting incentives may still loom over “unprotected” out-of-court workouts. All in all, the 
empirical evidence suggests that the Legally Enhanced Workouts are definitely important for “big 
deals,” particularly when there is enough time to engage in negotiations and gather the 
corresponding requirements. Indeed, other things being equal, external legal advisers turning to an 
“unprotected” out-of-court workout will endeavor to attach as well a business plan from an 
independent expert. The social impact of the SBA reforms carried out by the Act on Support of 
Entrepreneurs and the Royal Decree-law 4/2014, of March 7, remains to be seen. 
Part II comprises a selected literature review of the public policy considerations that ground the 
debate between the compulsory judicial oversight of corporate insolvency and out-of-court 
transactional alternatives. Part III is concerned with the analysis of the data and the discussion about 
the reasons for the decreasing use of the Legally Enhanced Workouts. Lastly, part IV contains the 
conclusions. 
                                                         
17 The empirical evidence stems from eighteen (18) interviews addressed to leading finance, restructuring, and 
bankruptcy lawyers from Madrid. They were selected using the most well known Spanish and international rankings: 
Best Lawyers, Chambers and Partners (Global and Europe), IFLR 1000, PLC Which Lawyer, Expert Guides, The Legal 500, 
and Who’s Who Legal. The interviewees, all of them with no less than 10 years of experience in the legal restructuring 
arena, are litigators or transactional lawyers. They were screened as well according to their different background 
prior to becoming practitioners (former judges, professors, or bankruptcy trustees). The snowballing strategy led to 
contacting the restructuring in-house counsel of one of Spain’s largest banks. This person is in charge of a team of 300 
lawyers that currently provides legal advice in more than 2,000 bankruptcy proceedings. Regardless of the way the 
interview was conducted, all of the interviewees demanded confidentiality. Some of them reported at the end of the 
interview that the questions had led them to express a high criticism of the current legal framework, which they 
would not repeat publicly. The selection of lawyers from Madrid as the research population seemed sensible for two 
reasons. First, 35 percent of the 2011 bankruptcy-proof out-of-court workouts, which represented 82.7 percent of 
claims subject to one of such out-of-court workouts, were concluded in Madrid. Second, reportedly there is no leading 
finance, restructuring, and bankruptcy law firm in Barcelona without an office in Madrid according to Spanish and 
international rankings. Therefore, the costs outweighed the benefits of extending the research population to other 
cities. Yet, further empirical work may extend the research to other cities in light of the statistics of subsequent years. 
It would be advisable to wait at least until 2016 to observe the data once the SBA’s reforms of 2013 and 2014 have 
settled among legal actors. 
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2. The tension between out-of-court workouts and bankruptcy to manage corporate 
insolvency. The law on the books and the law in action approach 
 
Under Spanish law, corporate insolvency refers to the inability to meet liabilities as they come due18. 
However, an insolvent ―a financially distressed― corporation may still be economically viable if it 
preserves its comparative advantage to compete in the market19. In such a case, the business has 
“going-concern value” because its assets are worth more put together as an operating business unit 
than if liquidated separately. Hence, an insolvent company may still succeed in the market place if it 
changes its capital structure through a workout, whether out-of-court or in bankruptcy20
 
.  
Bankruptcy exists to address insolvency’s collective action problem (the deadly race against the 
debtor’s assets21) by reducing the transactions costs that creditors would otherwise bear. This being 
said, bankruptcy’s transaction costs may outweigh the upsides of filing a petition. The issue is 
whether or not bankruptcy’s hurdles (such as the automatic stay) are always that worth it for 
unsecured creditors, the new residual claimants of debtor’s assets provided that the claims exceed 
the assets’ value22. For instance, insolvency’s collective action problem may be less severe in the case 
of going-concern companies with concentrated capital structure, where an out-of-court workout may 
enable going-concern companies23
                                                        
18 See article 2 of the SBA. 
 ―and their creditors― to minimize transaction costs. It may also 
permit to avoid, for example, the brand prejudice that may occur in bankruptcy and the sure external 
interference in debtor’s corporate governance. From this perspective, bankruptcy may be 
characterized as an optimal venue to handle corporate insolvency upon the failure of the rest of 
corporate and negotiated mechanisms (such as an out-of-court workout). In other words, bankruptcy 
may step in when asymmetric information and stakeholders’ different incentives make transaction 
 
19 Differently put, corporate insolvency may be related to financial and/or economic distress. Whereas economic 
distress may stem from the loss of the debtor’s comparative advantage, financial distress arises when liabilities exceed 
the company’s assets (or, under Spanish law, when the debtor cannot pay the debts as they come due). 
 
20 A composition agreement is just a judicially supervised workout.  
 
21 This is an example of the prisoner’s dilemma. See ADLER, BAIRD & JACKSON (2007, pages 7-19). 
 
22 Unsecured creditors step in the shoes of the shareholders as the residual claimants of the corporation upon 
insolvency provided that the claims exceed the assets’ value. As such, unsecured creditors become the stakeholders 
with best incentives to maximize the assets value since they benefit from an efficient management in the margin (they 
may recover a higher percentage of their claims). As a result (or, at least, as holders of the residual decision rights), 
unsecured creditors should have standing to file a derivative lawsuit, as well as voice and voting rights as per the 
solution to remove insolvency, whether it is handled out-of-court or in bankruptcy.  
 
23 To be sure, both financially and economically failed companies may also prefer dealing with corporate insolvency 
out-of-court for a lot of reasons. On the other hand, atomized capital structures may convert bankruptcy into the only 
attainable venue to handle corporate insolvency. 
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costs related to the hidden action and the moral hazard problems unmanageable. Thus, going-
concern companies, especially those with a high degree of debt concentration, may find it attractive 
to draw on an out-of-court workout to deal with corporate insolvency. This should be an ex ante 
choice almost exclusively grounded on the economies of transaction costs, though conveniently 
monitored ex post by the residual claimants of debtor’s assets. 
 
Under Spanish law, however, bankruptcy petition is compulsory. Filing is a must within two months 
as from debtor’s actual or constructive awareness of its insolvency24. As a matter of law, bankruptcy 
judges must oversee corporate reorganization or the liquidation of insolvent debtors’ assets through 
a bankruptcy proceeding. Hence, the SBA establishes that bankruptcy is the sole venue to deal with 
corporate insolvency. This is arguably a response to past strategic behavior in detriment of 
unsecured creditors25
 
.  
In contrast, the law in action approach shows that bankruptcy is not the first choice for going-
concern companies, which usually draw on out-of-court alternatives to handle corporate 
insolvency26
 
. In fact, corporate debtors petition bankruptcy where it is not possible to turn to out-of-
court restructuring alternatives. Instead of bankruptcy compositions, going-concern companies draw 
on out-of-court workouts “in the shadows of bankruptcy” to handle corporate insolvency.  
First, whilst the SBA formally pursues corporate reorganization through a composition agreement as 
bankruptcy’s “normal” solution to maximize creditor recovery, official statistics show that more than 
90 percent of bankrupt companies are liquidated27. Moreover, only 7.13 percent of the pending 
bankruptcy proceedings in 2011 (202 out of 2,835) were aimed at reaching a composition 
agreement28. Official data shows that this figure ultimately stems from the impaired economic and 
financial condition upon the filing29                                                        
24 See article 5 of the SBA. 
. Most companies filing a bankruptcy petition have already failed 
 
25 See preamble to the SBA.  
 
26 Indeed, the SBA’s oversight of privately conducted out-of-court schemes never prevented stakeholders from 
turning to this possibility at all. See ROJO (2003, page 30). Notably, Professor ROJO does not dispute that the petition 
should be compulsory for insolvent debtors. Quite the opposite, he notes the convenience of out-of-court solutions to 
deal with pre-insolvency.  
 
27 According to official statistics, the debtor’s assets were liquidated in 92.7 percent of 2011 bankruptcy proceedings. 
Only 287 bankruptcy proceedings out of 2,920 (9.83 percent) concluded in 2011 with the judicial approval of a 
composition agreement. It is important to note, however, that liquidation may follow if the composition fails. Indeed, 
2.8 percent of total liquidations in 2011 followed a previously failed composition agreement. See VAN HEMMEN (2012, 
pages 19-36). 
 
28 See VAN HEMMEN (2012, page 21). Ninety-two (92.87) percent of 2011 unconcluded bankruptcy proceedings were 
aimed at liquidating debtor’s assets. 
 
29 Without challenging the convenience of further incentivizing post-petition financing as some authors contend, this 
issue may not have such a direct relationship with the number of companies that are liquidated. To be sure, this paper 
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both financially and economically. Sixty-one percent of 2011 bankrupt companies had negative 
operative margin, whereas 72 percent of 2011 bankrupt companies would not be able to pay back 
their claims in less than 25 years30. Not surprisingly, economic scholars estimate that only 11 percent 
of companies going bankrupt in 2011 would be able to reach a composition agreement31. As a result, 
the primacy of liquidation over composition is not expected to turn around, at least, for three years32. 
Although liquidation does not necessarily entail piecemeal liquidation and the shuttering of business 
units33
 
, compositions are far from consisting of the “normal” solution to bankruptcy.  
Second, the largest financially troubled companies prefer to turn to out-of-court workouts. The size 
(total liabilities) of a bankruptcy proceeding in Spain is on average 6.5 million Euros, while the mean 
is 1.27 million Euros34. Only 10.6 percent of companies going bankrupt in 2011 have liabilities over 10 
million Euros. Furthermore, the data shows a decreasing size of the companies going bankrupt. On 
the other hand, companies turning to a Legally Enhanced Workout35 have on average liabilities of 
310 million Euros (mean 37 million) 36
 
. Although bankruptcy is formally compulsory to manage 
insolvency, blue-chips do endeavor in actuality to avoid the petition until the last moment. In other 
words, the filing occurs when piecemeal liquidation seems to be the most feasible solution to 
insolvency’s collective action problem. Bankruptcy has also become the residual option to handle 
corporate insolvency of financially distressed but economically viable flagships.  
Therefore, under Spanish law insolvent corporate debtors must file a bankruptcy petition, which 
most likely will lead to their piecemeal liquidation. As a result, the SBA’s twofold goal has arguably 
failed. Going-concern companies dislike bankruptcy, which, far from being a venue for corporate                                                                                                                                                                                    
does not intend to criticize such proposals. It does, however, put emphasis on the actual data to argue the reasons of 
the unsettling statistics regarding creditor recovery in bankruptcy.  
 
30 See VAN HEMMEN (2012, page 14). 
 
31 See VAN HEMMEN (2012, pages 18 and 99).  
 
32 No less than three years is the average duration of bankruptcy for companies with liabilities over €10Million. In 
addition, only 11 percent of 2011 filing companies are expected to avoid liquidation in light of their financial accounts 
and accounting ratios upon petition. See VAN HEMMEN (2012, pages 18 and 99).  
 
33  Liquidation promotes the sale of business units as a going-concern. Yet, this occurs when the business is 
economically viable, which is not what the statistics suggest. See articles 149 and 191 ter of the SBA. 
 
34 See VAN HEMMEN (2012, pages 6-9). 
 
35 Although the Legally Enhanced Workouts are “totally” out-of-court (for instance, without judicial or administrative 
oversight), one of the former requirements to shield the workout against claw-back consisted of the appointment of 
an independent expert by the commercial registrar. This has permitted to track a statistical record of the Legally 
Enhanced Workouts until the Royal Decree-law 4/2014, of March 7. 
 
36 See VAN HEMMEN (2012, pages 133-135). 
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reorganization, has turned out to be chiefly a liquidation proceeding for both financially and 
economically distressed companies.  
 
The Spanish branches reportedly attempted to address this issue in the SBA’s reforms of 200937 and 
201138. The Legally Enhanced Workouts were thought to partially fix this problem. This flagship of 
the “new Spanish pre-bankruptcy law” received a general positive assessment in broad terms39. 
Hence, the Legally Enhanced Workouts, the “luxury product” of the out-of-court workouts, were 
arguably expected to contribute to fix the unsettling recovery statistics and to protect “going-concern 
value” 40
 
. In a way, however, certain scholars assessed their success by looking at “best foreign 
insolvency law practices” from German, French, Italian, the U.K., or the U.S. legal systems. They 
pointed to some aspects that were still missing. Other authors claimed straightforwardly that the 
Spanish legislature tried to import unsuccessfully the U.K. scheme of arrangement.  
Yet, no research work has empirically analyzed the actual “social impact” of the Legally Enhanced 
Workouts. Indeed, while corporate bankruptcy proceedings increased steadily (16.79 percent) 
between 2009 and 2011, the Legally Enhanced Workouts experienced a significant drop (55.56 
percent) within the same period of time 41. Given the increase in bankruptcy proceedings, this 
evidence is surprising. Most importantly, unofficial sources of information suggest that stakeholders 
drew on unprotected out-of-court workouts42                                                        
37 Royal Decree-Law 3/2009 of March 27, 2009 on urgent tax, financial, and insolvency law measures in view of the 
unfolding economic situation. 
. This is puzzling because stakeholders would prefer 
 
38 Spanish Act 38/2011 of October 10, 2011, which partially reforms the Spanish Act 22/2003 of July 9, 2003 of 
Bankruptcy. 
 
39 However, practitioners have criticized practical issues akin to the Legally Enhanced Workouts. See DE CÁRDENAS 
(2012, pages 11-12 and 29-34), and COTTA & VIDAL (2012, pages 21-36). 
 
40 See PULGAR (2012b, pages 8-11). Professor PULGAR concludes that the 2011 reform was a necessary update to adapt 
the SBA to comparative law’s reforms. More specifically, she refers to German, Italian, and the French legal systems. 
While she acknowledges that the SBA is still improvable, she praises the new legal tools that would enable the 
restructuring of insolvent companies, either out-of-court or in bankruptcy.  
 
41 One hundred and eighty two Legally Enhanced Workouts were concluded between March 27, 2009 –the date of the 
SBA’s 2009 reform– and December 31, 2011. While there were 90 Legally Enhanced Workouts in 2009, only 40 were 
concluded in 2011. See VAN HEMMEN (2012, pages 129-137). Yet, the Legally Enhanced Workouts are definitely 
significant in qualitative terms (15 billion in 2009; 3.148 billion in 2010; and 12.395 billion in 2012). Nevertheless, this 
research work is primarily concerned with the reasons that may explain why someone would turn to an 
“unprotected” workout ignoring the advantages of drawing on a Legally Enhanced Workout. Notwithstanding the 
importance of the global figures, this analysis requires to focus primarily on the number of workouts. 
 
42 According to an unofficial source of information (Thomson), at least the conclusion of 247 out-of-court workouts 
was communicated between March 27, 2009 and December 31, 2011. Consequently, at least 65 of all the concluded 
workouts (26.31 percent) did not turn to the Legally Enhanced Workouts’ privileged regime. Importantly, any noise 
can only mean a higher number of total workouts. This data may have been obtained from public companies’ 
information duties and social media because Spanish companies do not have a duty to file an out-of-court workout 
with any authority or registrar. Only public listed companies, which represent a very little percentage of the total, 
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turning to “unprotected” out-of-court workouts at the expense of the legal incentives akin to the 
flagship of the so-called “Spanish pre-bankruptcy law”43. While bankruptcy is, in fact, the residual 
solution to deal with corporate insolvency, “unprotected” workouts seem to be beating the Legally 
Enhanced Workouts in the “shadow” out-of-court restructuring arena. Why would stakeholders turn 
to “unprotected” out-of-court workouts at the expense of the legal incentives akin to the Legally 
Enhanced Workouts? This paper intends to fill in the gap in the literature and empirically explore, 
through the lens of lawyers, the reasons that might explain the apparently low degree of “social 
impact” of the Legally Enhanced Workouts44
 
.  
 
3. Analysis of the data and discussion: reasons that account for the decreasing use 
of the Legally Enhanced Workouts between 2009 and 2011 
 
3.1. General overview: the SBA’s 2009 and 2011 reforms were reactive 
 
The data leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis 45 . Persuaded by previous scholarship, I 
intended to assess whether or not the decreasing use of the Legally Enhanced Workouts was actually 
related to the alleged failed attempt to copy foreign “best legal practices”. I speculated that the SBAs’ 
2009 and 2011 reforms might embrace a case of “magic legalism”46
 
. Thus, I hypothesized that 
lawyers might be “undermining” the “social impact” of these reforms (advising their clients to turn 
to “unprotected” workouts) for whatever reasons I wanted to explore.  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
have a duty to report to the Spanish security exchange commission (“Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores”) 
about the negotiation and eventual conclusion of a workout. Thus, a higher number of total workouts would mean a 
lower percentage of use of the Legally Enhanced Workouts. 
 
43 See FERNÁNDEZ (2009, pages 64-65). Pre-bankruptcy and pre-insolvency law may be treated as synonyms because 
bankruptcy is still compulsory to deal with insolvency under Spanish law.  
 
44 In other words, rather than criticizing doctrinally the alleged Spanish legislature’s failure for having fallen short in 
“copying” best foreign legal practices, this paper seeks to understand empirically, from a “law in action” approach, 
why the Legally Enhanced Workouts are used decreasingly. Perhaps it is true that a legal device similar to the UK 
scheme of arrangement might fix some issues. There may be, however, other reasons beyond those normative 
arguments. Thus, the aim of this paper is to explore what is really missing in the Spanish restructuring legal 
framework. 
 
45 The null hypothesis was the following: the Legally Enhanced Workouts had not had as much social impact as 
expected because the Spanish branches would have made a transplant of foreign rules without taking account of local 
legal culture.  
46 See ALGUÍNDIGUE & PÉREZ-PERDOMO (2008). The authors use the concept of “magical legalism” to show that foreign 
successful legal practices may not work in a society with a different legal culture (citizens’ legal concerns and 
expectations). See also PISTOR, BERKOWITZ & RICHARD (1999). 
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The data actually suggests that the Spanish branches did not proactively decide to import “foreign 
best practices” without analyzing their “social impact” in the restructuring arena. Quite the opposite, 
the research throws out that the reforms were prompted by a social outcry and lobbying pressure to 
introduce foreign tools that might address the deficiencies of the SBA in preserving going-concern 
value. However, the reforms, at least the reforms finally enacted, did not succeed as expected. 
Practitioners do endeavor to adapt their advice to the risks raised by debatable judicial criteria and 
by the overdue or even unhelpful legal reforms. Rather than playing a role as “double agents” 47
 
, 
Spanish practitioners struggle to address their clients’ concerns and expectations. Legal advice deals 
with a challenging framework, where inadequate reforms sometimes worsen the situation. Some of 
the interviewees expressly criticized the lack of practical expertise of the majority of the members of 
the legislature’s commission that drafted the 2011 reform. One of the interviewees even asserted that 
the idea of importing the U.K. scheme of arrangement had been advised by a Spanish law firm.  
3.2. The 2009 reform, though important, was reactive, inadequate, and overdue 
 
The SBA’s 2009 reform was not only an attempt to copy Italian or French law to protect out-of-court 
workouts against claw-back. The data shows that the Spanish government was prompted by a very 
strong lobbying effort 48, which reacted against certain unsettling judicial decisions for lenders’ 
interest49. This was the first time Spanish law referred to out-of-court workouts explicitly, arguably 
as a result of the social outcry50 (including an allegedly very important lobby by the Asociación 
Española de la Banca, the Spanish bank association)51
                                                        
47 Because lawyers, expert jurists, “translate” legal reforms to their clients, one may argue that they serve two different 
and sometimes conflicting interests. See LANGEVOORT & RASMUSSEN (1997).  
. One of the interviewees furthermore claimed 
that the out-of-court workouts’ protection against claw-back had actually become a need following 
Martinsa-Fadesa, S.A.’s bankruptcy proceeding, the largest bankruptcy proceeding ever in Spain at 
 
48 One of the interviewees furthermore asserted that the SBA’s 2009 reform was prompted to “bless” an out-of-court 
workout aimed at refinancing an important Spanish public listed company (ACS -Actividades de Construcción y 
Servicios, S.A.-). Another one suggested that one of the reasons for which Martinsa-Fadesa, S.A. filed a bankruptcy 
petition in July 14, 2008 was banks’ reluctance to reach a new out-of-court workout in light of the claw-back risk in 
subsequent bankruptcy. See PULGAR (2009a, 2012, pages 1-8, and pages 409 ff.), respectively, and SÁNCHEZ-CALERO 
(2009, page 11). According to the latter, a former successful workout was concluded in May of 2008. Just following the 
declaration, the bankruptcy trustees sought a preliminary restraining order in merits of a claw-back action dated May 
7, 2008, which aimed at avoiding the security interests granted in that workout. The author also reminds the reader of 
the media coverage of this case. See: 
http://www.expansion.com/2009/01/16/empresas/inmobiliario/1232142180.html. 
 
49 Perhaps the most well known case is the order against Banco Espirito Santo from the commercial judge nº 1 of 
Madrid as of May 21, 2007 (AC 2008, 1603; Reporting Judge: Antoni Frigola). In addition to avoiding the new security 
interests, the claim was subordinated on a bad faith basis. This case led to the so-called “probatio diabolica”. 
 
50 See FERNÁNDEZ (2009, pages 64- 65). According to him, the social demand leading to the protection of the Legally 
Enhanced Workouts was unprecedented in Spain. 
 
51 Various interviewees referred to the lobbying work of this association. 
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that juncture52. Not surprisingly, the 2009 reform was enacted as a royal decree-law by the Spanish 
government, which was eventually confirmed by the legislature53
 
.  
Despite any similarities with the French and Italian regulations of claw-back protection, the 
interviews suggest that the SBA’s 2009 reform was actually a reaction to social outcry and lobbying 
pressure. First, it was an accelerated reaction to “legally bless” out-of-court workouts. The SBA’s 
plain language did not mention them, which encompassed certain judicial decisions that were 
particularly severe in deciding claw-back cases. The reform aimed at protecting out-of-court 
workouts against claw-back to “fix” that unsettling judicial interpretation in order to give comfort to 
professional adjusting creditors. Second, the Spanish government reportedly became aware in 2009 
of the statistics showing that more than 90 percent of bankrupt companies were liquidated. The 
reform tacitly underscored for the first time the SBA’s failure to preserve going-concern value.  
 
Although welcome in broad terms (perhaps rather the intention than the actual reform), the reform 
was also overdue. The majority of the interviewees pointed to a specific judicial order that unsettled 
the credit and the restructuring Spanish markets. Banco Espirito Santo suffered on May 21, 2007 both 
the avoidance of a security interest granted in favor of an antecedent debt and the subordination of 
its claim on the debatable grounds of bad faith54. This case brought about the concept of probatio 
diabolica with regard to the claw-back’s rebuttable presumptions under the SBA55. The reform, dated 
March 22, 2009, arrived too late to fix the issue. On February 6, 2009, the 15th section of Barcelona’s 
Court of Appeals (and eventually the Spanish Supreme Court in September of 201056) had already 
come up with a new interpretation of claw-back’s legal presumptions as per out-of-court workouts57
                                                        
52 Martinsa, S.A., a non-listed corporation, had obtained a syndicated loan to take over and subsequently merge with 
Fadesa, S.A., a listed company, in the largest public-to-private transaction of 2006 in Spain. It consisted of a syndicated 
loan of €4.100 Billion participated in by 45 Spanish and international banks. 
. 
This new judicial doctrine was purported to fix the foresaid challenging precedent that was deterring 
banks from engaging in out-of-court workouts. The court referred to the concept of “unjustified 
 
53 Former Spanish Minister of Justice (Mr. Francisco Caamaño) announced a new reform with a broader scope during 
the Spanish legislature’s debate to confirm and validate the SBA’s 2009 reform. Mr. Caamaño represented that the 
2009 reform was the most efficient device to address the current and urgent needs of companies and workers. He 
explained that the Spanish Government would entrust the General Codifying Commission (“Comisión General de 
Codificación”) to appoint a sub-commission to prepare a draft bill that eventually gave rise to the 2011 reform. 
 
54 The commercial judges of Catalunya underscore this resolution in their paper of July 5, 2013, which contains their 
criteria as per certain practical issues of the out-of-court workouts.  
 
55 Some interviewees argued that, though technically incorrect (as it consists of second-guess business judgment in 
hindsight), it was hard to rebut the burden of proof of prejudice. Evidently enough, the workout and its economic 
scenario ended-up failing as shown by the subsequent bankruptcy.  
 
56 Judicial order of September 16, 2010 (RJ 2010, 5597; Reporting Judge: Jesús Corbal). 
 
57 Docket number 607/2008. 
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estate’s prejudice” to embrace a wide perspective of the multiple transactions or considerations a 
workout may consist of. According to it, the mere presence of prejudice, either directly or through 
the application of the SBA’s legal presumptions, should not lead directly to avoid the transaction at 
issue. Avoidance should only follow inadequate consideration for the estate. In short, creditors ought 
to have the chance to justify, with a kind of shift in the burden of proof, why the workout made 
economic sense instead of filing for bankruptcy, regardless of whether or not the out-of-court 
workout eventually failed.  
 
3.3. Accounting incentives and strategic behavior during the credit crunch 
 
According to the “law on the books”, the SBA’s 2009 reform only protected out-of-court workouts 
aimed at preventing insolvency. In fact, stakeholders drew on them to deal with both pre-insolvency 
and actual insolvency.  
 
While unsettling liquidation statistics and other flaws of the bankruptcy proceeding may contribute 
to understand stakeholders’ runaway from bankruptcy, this phenomenon is also explained by banks’ 
accounting incentives to engage in strategic behavior. Annex IX to the Spanish Bank’s regulation 
4/2004 on claims’ losses was puzzling for banks’ financial statements in a no less challenging 
financial environment. It obliged banks to register accounting losses upon bankruptcy’s declaration, 
regardless of whether or not the debtor had a chance to reach a judicially approved composition 
agreement. In other words, the duty to register a loss was exactly the same for debtors with 
prospects of reorganization and for those irremediably condemned to liquidation. In contrast, banks 
could avoid such loss with the removal of insolvency out-of-court. Hence, there were important 
accounting incentives to promote out-of-court workouts instead of going bankrupt notwithstanding 
the debtor’s economic viability. 
 
The reader may wisely point out that accounting losses ought to be registered well ahead of a 
bankruptcy declaration. At any event, accounting registration should not depend on whether the 
workout was out-of-court or judicial. Yet, it is important to note the economic context in which this 
issue took place. At that moment (from 2008 to the beginning of 2010), the Spanish government still 
contended that the Spanish banks comprised the safest financial system in the world.58
 
 Thus, this 
would have been just an example of the accounting tools and strategic behavior that permitted 
certain Spanish banks to delay reporting their unsettling financial situation. 
Banks’ strategic behavior also raised a public policy issue. The out-of-court workouts were not 
merely pursued as a more efficient way to deal with corporate insolvency in order to reduce 
bankruptcy’s transaction costs. True, this was an economic decision. However, it did not consist of a 
“market” correction to a government problem: the lack of efficiency of the official mechanisms (the 
bankruptcy proceeding) to handle insolvency’s collective action problem by preserving going-
concern value. Stakeholders were not turning to a loophole to reduce transaction costs. Banks did not                                                         
58 See: http://www.expansion.com/2008/09/24/economia-politica/economia/1168531.html.  
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prefer the out-of-court restructuring arena ―merely― to handle corporate insolvency in a more 
efficient manner. Accounting incentives led banks to avoid or at least delay bankruptcy petition the 
longer the better. As a result, the combination of bankruptcy petition’s duty suspension period and 
banks’ accounting incentives thwarted one of the two main goals pursued by the Spanish legislature 
in the SBA’s 2009 reform. In contrast to the reform’s purpose of preserving going-concern value, 
banks’ strategic behavior permitted insolvent and economically distressed companies to avoid 
bankruptcy and remain in market place as “zombies”. The reader may think of certain real estate 
companies that, unfortunately, wishfully expected better market conditions from 2011 onwards.  
 
In any event, the legal actors and the policy makers ended up learning the reasons that led banks to 
avoid bankruptcy beyond the scary liquidation statistics. Not surprisingly, the Bank of Spain ended 
up reforming the administrative regulation that supported this strategic behavior. Indeed, this 
regulation has been amended ten times from January 20, 2010, to October 3, 201259
 
. Nowadays, banks 
must register a loss of 25 percent of a claim’s face value upon a bankruptcy’s declaration. The head of 
restructuring of one Spain’s largest banks asserted that banks do totally register now the loss at the 
beginning of the negotiations of an out-of-court workout. The reforms of Spanish Economy Minister 
(Mr. de Guindos), he said, do not leave any further room for strategic behavior. Another different 
thing, he acknowledged, is the bank’s goal of trying to “de-register” losses with an offsetting profit 
as soon as possible. 
No doubt, this strategic behavior may contribute to explain why a significant number of out-of-court 
workouts did not turn to the legally enhanced regime. A workout just aimed at delaying bankruptcy 
could have never met the requirement of a short-term or medium-term economic viability plan. A 
“zombie” company could never qualify for the legally enhanced regime. However, the strategic 
behavior does not seem to shed light on the decreasing use of the Legally Enhanced Workouts. All in 
all, this issue might have negative externalities for the rest of the out-of-court workouts that, for any 
of the other reasons explained below, did not draw on the legally enhanced regime.  
 
The “in-house” head of restructuring of one of the largest Spanish banks confirmed this scenario60
                                                        
59 Further amendments have followed after the completion of this research work. 
. 
Two of the interviewees however considered that the Bank of Spain’s reforms may give rise to a 
higher number of bankruptcy proceedings and, somehow, also to a decreasing use of the Legally 
Enhanced Workouts. To be sure, the strategic behavior previous to the reforms may help to explain 
the steadily increasing number of bankruptcy proceedings between 2009 and 2011. But, again, as 
“zombie companies” could never qualify for the legally enhanced regime, the accounting incentives 
cannot explain the stakeholders’ decision to draw on “unprotected workouts” at the expense of the 
 
60 He insisted, nevertheless, that this strategic behavior is no longer feasible after the last reforms of the Bank of 
Spain’s regulation. He moreover asserted that not all of the Spanish banks had developed the same strategic behavior, 
as, he said, one may now figure out retrospectively.  
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incentives akin to the Legally Enhanced Workouts. This strategic behavior has nothing to do with the 
choice between reaching a “general” workout or a Legally Enhanced Workout, other things being 
equal. When inquired about the reasons of the connection of the Bank of Spain’s reforms with the 
increasing number of other “unprotected workouts”, these interviewees argued that economic agents 
are still afraid of the discouraging statistics of the bankruptcy proceeding. Instead of providing 
creditors with the chance to deal with corporate insolvency, bankruptcy deters stakeholders from 
filing the petition, they said. According to them, the disappearance of accounting incentives has 
encouraged banks to not engage in strategic behavior regarding the choice between an out-of-court 
workout or filing the bankruptcy petition. Still, this assertion cannot explain why stakeholders turn 
to “unprotected” out-of-court workouts at the expense of the incentives akin to the Legally Enhanced 
Workouts. Fortunately, another interviewee shed some light on this issue. She first of all confirmed 
that accounting incentives had nothing to do with the choice between “unprotected” or Legally 
Enhanced Workouts61. Interestingly, she then affirmed that the myriad reforms of the Banks of 
Spain’s regulation have not yet totally erased the incentives that may lead to strategic behavior. 
While she admitted that the 25 percent difference between the out-of-court workout and the 
bankruptcy petition has balanced the initial decision, she pointed to another misbalance between an 
out-of-court workout and a pre-packaged composition. The difference lies in the flexibility to register 
an offsetting profit once insolvency is removed. In fact, banks are not entitled to set off losses 
immediately after the judicial approval of the composition agreement, while they have more 
discretion to do so outside of bankruptcy62
 
. Under Annex IX to the Bank of Spain’s regulation 
4/2004, banks must not register an offsetting profit (i) until debtor pays 25 percent of the claims 
participating in (and as amended by) the judicially approved composition agreement, or (ii) after two 
years as from the judicial approval, provided that there are no doubts about debtor´s solvency to 
make future payments. In actuality, it makes no sense that a judicially overseen workout raises more 
accounting issues than a workout that is privately conducted out-of-court. 
Without countering this issue (the mismatch in the flexibility to register an offsetting profit), the in-
house head of restructuring of one of the largest Spanish banks stressed that accounting incentives 
are not currently a key factor in any decision related to insolvent companies63
                                                        
61 She referred to other reasons explained below. 
. Asked about whether 
or not this may depend on the bank’s policy, this interviewee insisted that Mr. de Guindos’ reforms 
did not leave any room for discretion. In furtherance of this, another interviewee who is a leading 
professor of commercial law and a practitioner agreed that the recent reforms of the Bank of Spain’s 
accounting regulation eliminate any likelihood of strategic behavior. According to her, these reforms 
 
62 Flexibility refers to the fact that banks are not compelled to act in either way. However, the accounting policy of a 
particular bank may lead to the same result out-of-court as the one compelling under bankruptcy according to the 
Bank of Spain’s regulation. 
 
63 Whether this assertion may be true for all of the employees in charge of the particular cases is likely to entail an 
agency problem that requires empirical analysis beyond the scope of this research work. 
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have increased dramatically the monitoring powers of the Bank of Spain over the economic viability 
of debtors reaching an out-of-court workout. This modification, she stressed, shall oblige banks to 
register an accounting loss up to 25 percent of their claim regardless of whether the workout is 
reached out-of-court or in bankruptcy.  
 
The social impact of this change remains to be seen. Certain interviewees were very skeptical. Most 
of them were very critical about the role of the Bank of Spain after the recent scandals. As a matter of 
law, the out-of-court workouts and the related accounting practice are certainly subject to a stricter 
level of supervision nowadays. Annex IX to the Bank of Spain’s regulation 4/2004 includes every 
kind of workout within the category of “transactions that require a special monitoring”. 
Furthermore, transactions with defaults in principal or security interests for more than three months 
are not “cured” with the conclusion of an out-of-court workout, unless certain additional 
requirements are met (for instance, the granting of a new security interest on account of an 
antecedent debt, which may be definitely subject to claw-back in turn). Apart from the flexibility to 
register an offsetting profit, the regulation seems all in all to have fixed the misbalance in banks’ 
accounting incentives, at least formally. Again, it is hard to determine whether or not its actual 
implementation may be effective in deterring strategic behavior. It will logically depend, first of all, 
on the resources of the supervisors.  
 
This has not changed as a result of the Royal Decree-law 4/2014, of March 7. As per the mandate to 
set forth the criteria to consider a refinanced debt instrument to have “normal risk” 64
 
, the Bank of 
Spain communicated on March 18, 2014 that such classification shall follow provided that there are 
objective items that allow concluding the probable recovery of the new amount as a result of the 
workout. In this regard, the Bank of Spain further stresses that attention shall be focused on the 
impact that the discharges and the debt-for-equity swaps may have over the recovery of the claim, 
which shall take account of the corresponding business plans. 
To sum up, the misbalance of incentives arising out of the Bank of Spain’s accounting regulation 
does not appear to have a direct relationship with the decreasing use of the Legally Enhanced 
Workouts. As a short-term or medium-term business plan is a requirement for the legally enhanced 
regime, “zombie” companies’ out-of-court workouts could have never qualified for the legally 
enhanced regime, in principle65
                                                        
64 It is important to note that this mandate is only referred to the Legally Enhanced Workout of article 71 bis and the 
additional section fourth of the SBA. 
. Hence, those incentives do not explain the decreasing use of the 
Legally Enhanced Workouts within the analyzed period of time. However, these incentives are a key 
 
65 Although none of the interviewees was asked about the actual independence of the independent experts, no one 
suggested any hint that may challenge that assumption. All in all, the Act on Support of Entrepreneurship and the 
Royal Decree-law 4/2014, of March 7, have addressed this issue. The independent expert must meet the requirements 
related to the appointment of the bankruptcy trustees under article 28 of the SBA. In addition, the independent shall 
comply with the incompatibility requirements under the auditing regulation.  
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fact to understand why banks wanted to delay or avoid the bankruptcy petition beyond claw-back, 
subordination, or even lender liability risk. The choice between an out-of-court workout (either 
“protected” or “unprotected”) or a bankruptcy petition accounted for this aspect, at least, until the 
beginning of the Bank of Spain’s reforms in 2010. Although the incentives are currently more 
balanced, banks are still better off outside of bankruptcy66
 
. Unfortunately, this might cast suspicion 
over those out-of-court workouts that do not draw on the legally enhanced regime for any of the 
reasons set forth below. This is the remaining negative externality of banks’ strategic behavior, which 
should prompt the greatest level of resources from the supervising authorities.  
3.4. Flaws making the Legally Enhanced Workouts too expensive in relative terms 
 
Banks’ legal advisers represented their astonishment when they learned about these statistics. They 
had not realized the decreasing use of the Legally Enhanced Workouts. They put forward that the 
assessment by an independent expert is actually a covenant to engage in negotiations aiming at 
reaching an out-of-court workout. Rather than challenging the official statistics, this point of view 
confirms that the Legally Enhanced Workouts are still qualitatively significant. This was agreed by 
all of the interviewees. Other things being equal, the interviewees would turn to a Legally Enhanced 
Workout when it comes to refinancing a major debtor, as long as the case is handled with sufficient 
time, which is rarely the case. The average case gets to their office very late, without enough time to 
figure the “ideal strategy” out, or even to gather all the corresponding requirements. In practice, 
external legal advisers endeavor to explain in the transactional documents the practical constraints 
that impeded the use of a Legally Enhanced Workout. One of the interviewees contended that his 
firm attaches a business plan from an independent auditor in every out-of-court workout regardless 
of whether or not it qualifies for the legally enhanced regime. 
 
On the other hand, external legal advisers with more experience in rendering legal assistance to 
debtors, especially litigators, offered some very interesting insights that may help to explain the 
“practical shortage” of the Legally Enhanced Workouts. In broad terms, they contended that the 
Legally Enhanced Workouts have become comparatively more expensive for several reasons. First, 
the judicial doctrine of “unjustified estate’s prejudice” provided banks with a chance to prove the 
economic sense of an out-of-court workout that could justify the detriment triggered by the legal 
presumptions of the SBA’s fraudulent conveyance regime. The absence of the “legal shield” is not an 
insurmountable obstacle in the legal defense against an avoiding action.  
 
                                                        
66 From the perspective of post-petition financing, other things being equal, banks do not have incentives to provide 
new money in light of the Bank of Spain’s accounting regulation. They must register automatically the corresponding 
loss (at least, 25 percent of the claim). As prepetition claims, the loss cannot furthermore be compensated until the 
debtor has paid 25 percent of the claims participating in (and as amended by) the judicially approved composition, or 
after two years since the judicial approval, provided that there are no doubts about future recovery. 
 
InDret 3/2014 Carlos Ara  
20  
Second, transactional and litigation lawyers criticized the lack of flexibility in the appointment of an 
independent expert67. They asserted that certain commercial registrars are reluctant to designate the 
expert before the conclusion of the negotiations. The issue, of course, is that the outcome of the 
independent expert’s report will most likely prompt amendments to the workout68. Significantly, the 
Act on Support of Entrepreneurs addressed this issue. The resulting article 71 bis of the SBA 
provided that the debtor might petition the appointment of an independent expert at any moment 
after the beginning of the negotiations. However, following the Royal Decree-law 4/2014, of March 
7, the independent expert’s report is not anymore a compulsory requirement for the purposes of 
earning claw-back protection69
 
. Whilst the parties may decide to have the expert appointed (either at 
the debtor’s or the creditors’ request), the current plain language of article 71 bis.4 of the SBA has not 
reproduced the former amendment by the Act on Support of Entrepreneurs. Yet, it seems sensible 
that the appointment may still be made at any point of the negotiations.  
Third, the interviewees complained about the lack of legal expertise of the majority of independent 
experts, who are economists or auditors. These experts are not required to be knowledgeable on 
insolvency law or even to team-up with a lawyer, and of course their knowledge is not evaluated 
before their appointment. Thus, while independent experts are qualified to issue an opinion on the 
short-term or medium-term economic viability of the business plan, they are not as familiar as they 
should, the interviewees said, with certain security interests, for instance. The proportionality of the 
resulting security interests according to current market conditions is indeed challenging for most 
lawyers, let alone economists. As a result, the outcome of their analysis is not as accurate as it should 
concerning the most significant legal issues. Most importantly, certain interviewees furthermore 
stressed that this lack of understanding and the independent expert’s liability regime may distort 
and jeopardize the goals of the report. Because the independent expert needs to protect herself 
against eventual liability actions, her lack of training in insolvency law is likely to prompt the 
inclusion of more qualifications in the report.  
 
Last but not least, litigators contended that the Legally Enhanced Workouts are not totally shielded 
against claw-back. The SBA’s 2009 reform did not clarify what the effects of any qualification in the 
report from the independent expert would be70                                                        
67 The commercial registrar appoints the independent expert within fifteen days from the debtor’s request. The 
independent expert must accept then the appointment within five days and, thereafter, the corresponding report must 
been issued within a month. 
. It remained unclear whether or not a claw-back 
 
68 However, another lawyer, who is also a professor of commercial law, casted doubt on it. She asserted that it is 
feasible to have the independent expert appointed during the negotiations. 
 
69 It is nonetheless possible to have the expert appointed, which is moreover important for other purposes, such as the 
exemption to launch a takeover bid following a debt-for-equity swap or in order to ascertain the reasonability of such 
corporate decision for the financial viability of the company. See footnote 13. 
 
70 Perhaps a perverse and unintended effect of the huge amount of scholarly work produced by professors, lawyers, 
economists, and even judges may be the plain language’s raised loopholes. It is remarkable that Spanish Supreme 
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action could be more likely to succeed on the merits in light of such qualifications, either because of 
actual concerns about the economic viability or because the expert’s lack of understanding of certain 
security interests. Hence there could be room for litigation. Declaratory relief might seek to challenge 
any of the requirements of the legally enhanced regime in order to pursue claw-back subsequently. 
This raised reasonable doubts about the vulnerability of the “legal shield”, making the Legally 
Enhanced Workouts more expensive in relative terms. According to some authors (bankruptcy 
judges) 71
 
, the Royal Decree-lay 4/2014, of March 7, has confirmed the possibility of seeking 
declaratory relief prior to the filing of a claw-back action to avoid a Legally Enhanced Workout. 
3.5. The shortcoming of the 2009 urgent measures and the subsequent reform of 2011 
 
The SBA’s “announced” second reform was enacted in October 2011. The provisions that concerned 
the Legally Enhanced Workouts entered into force immediately. The question that follows is why 
this new reform, which further incentivized the negotiation and conclusion of the Legally Enhanced 
Workouts, brought about a decreasing use of this new “fancy” legal device. True, these provisions 
entered into force in October. However, the bankruptcy proceedings increased in 2011, while the 
Legally Enhanced Workouts decreased. Despite the short period of time the statistics are not 
consistent with the reforms.  
 
In particular, the reader may wonder whether or not the 2011 SBA’s reform helped to fix any of the 
issues noted above, particularly the consequences of the independent experts’ qualifications 
regarding a claw-back action in subsequent bankruptcy. Unfortunately, the interviewees asserted, 
the 2011 reform failed to be clear in this respect. Under article 71.6 of the SBA, the parties had to 
assess the legal risk of the independent experts’ qualifications. To make things worse, article 72.2’s 
plain language raised concerns about whether or not the trustee might seek declaratory relief to 
challenge the requirements of the “shield” 72
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Court’s Justice Ignacio SANCHO criticized the allegations about loopholes and inconsistencies in the SBA’s plain 
language regarding the Legally Enhanced Workouts’ protection against claw-back. He asserted that the SBA’s intent 
could not be clearer. See SANCHO (2009, pages 16-25). See also the document of July 5, 2013 that contains the criteria of 
the commercial judges of Catalunya as per certain practical issues of the out-of-court workouts. On the other hand, 
other judges pointed to the feasibility of such way around to challenge the workout by means of former declaratory 
relief. See NIETO (2013, page 16). 
. The Royal Decree-law 4/2014, of March 7, has not 
addressed this issue. Under article 71 bis.4 of the SBA, the parties still have to assess the 
qualifications if they choose to appoint an independent expert as to claw-back protection, whilst 
 
71 See YÁÑEZ & NIETO (2014, page 10). 
 
72 Whereas article 71.6 of the SBA stated that the Legally Enhanced Workouts were not subject to claw-back (with the 
caveat of the qualifications from the independent expert’s report), article 72.2 indicated that only the bankruptcy 
trustee had standing to bring a SBA’s claw-back or any other private law action against workouts. This inconsistency 
brought some authors to suggest seeking declaratory relief aimed at stating that one of the requirements failed and, 
subsequently, bringing a claw-back action against the “unsecured” workout as it did not qualify for the legally 
enhanced regime. See NIETO (2012). Notably, the author is a commercial judge. 
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article 72.2 indicates that the trustee may only ground a claw-back action on the absence of the 
requirements set forth under article 71 bis.1 & 2 of the SBA73
 
. 
Litigators furthermore represented that they are increasingly concerned about claw-back as the 
economic crisis elapses over time. Companies are undergoing second or even third workouts74
 
. 
Nobody expected in 2007 that the economic crisis would loom until 2014, at least. Hence, the 
interviewees pointed out, short-term or medium-term viable business plans might be thwarted 
rather more successfully now than in 2009. The shortage in the “legal shield” may thus explain as 
well why there are more “unprotected” workouts than expected.  
To sum up, the SBA’s 2009 and 2011 reforms, while well-aimed and well-intentioned, set initial 
positive but imperfect steps to reach their goals concerning out-of-court workouts. They consist of an 
overdue and imperfect reaction to social outcry and lobbying pressure. The Legally Enhanced 
Workouts have become more expensive than an “unprotected” out-of-court workout in relative 
terms. 
 
3.6. Are the Legally Enhanced Workouts expected to “work out” in a profound and 
enlarged economic crisis? 
 
The interviewees suggested that the prolongation of the economic crisis might also explain the 
decreasing use of the Legally Enhanced Workouts. Further empirical research may analyze the 
existence of an inverse relationship between the breadth and duration of the economic crisis and the 
number of Legally Enhanced Workouts75
 
.  
When asked about the reasons for the decreasing use of the Legally Enhanced Workouts following 
the SBA’s 2011 reform, certain interviewees contended that they are not that useful now. Turning to a 
Legally Enhanced Workout makes sense, and banks indeed require it as covenant to negotiate, they 
said, as long as there is new money or additional security interests to grant on account of antecedent 
or new debts. Certain corporations are undergoing their second or third out-of-court workout since 
the onset of the financial crisis. Hence, there may not be any more assets or equity free of liens and 
encumbrances to offer new security interests. In addition, banks are not willing to extend new money 
given their own capital needs and the subsequent general credit restriction. Finally, a transactional                                                         
73 See footnote 13. 
 
74 After seeking unsuccessfully its fourth out-of-court workout since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, Reyal 
Urbis, S.A., a Spanish listed public real estate company, filed the bankruptcy petition in 2013. It is the second largest 
bankruptcy proceeding in Spanish history after Martinsa-Fadesa, S.A.’s. 
http://www.expansion.com/2013/02/19/empresas/inmobiliario/1361257807.html.  
 
75 To be sure, the exploratory stage of this research work does not enable to draw any conclusion inferable to the 
research population, let alone the announcement of a causal relationship or its direction. However, perhaps others 
may build on these traces to ascertain whether or not such a causal relationship may exist, and why. 
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lawyer argued that banks will not be willing to extend new money to a company if they are obliged 
to register an accounting loss amounting at least to 25 percent of their total exposure to it. Hence, the 
absence of new security interests and prepetition new money would also make the Legally Enhanced 
Workouts more expensive than a “general” out-of-court workout in relative terms. 
 
In short, the SBA’s reform of 2011 linked the “fresh money privilege” to prepetition new money 
granted within the framework of Legally Enhanced Workouts. Paradoxically, therefore, the reform 
made it even more expensive to turn to a Legally Enhanced Workouts within the current economic 
context.  
 
3.7. A first approach to the Royal Decree-law 4/2014, of March 7 
 
These results may be useful in doing a first non empirical approach to the brand-new reform of the 
SBA carried out by the Royal Decree-law 4/2014, of March 7, which deprives the unprotected out-of-
court workouts of any of the fostered legal incentives to remove insolvency through a negotiated 
solution. Indeed, the dichotomy between out-of-court workouts and bankruptcy is still at issue. The 
reform has addressed again the majority of the concerns akin to the Legally Enhanced Workouts.  
 
First, it has eased the negotiation, conclusion, and protection of workouts concerning financial 
claims. A majority of 51 percent of the financial claims is enough to put in place an automatic stay 
concerning enforcement actions and to request a court-sanctioned bankruptcy-proof out-of-court 
workout, which might only be challenged by the trustee on merits of any of the more restraining 
rescission actions of the Spanish Civil Code. In addition, the holdout problem and certain assignees’ 
greenmailing strategies are likely to disappear since the law refers to creditors holding financial 
claims instead of financial entities. The invulnerability of creditors holding secured financial claims 
has also come to an end. Sixty-five percent or 80 percent of the secured financial claims may agree to 
enter into a workout that may be crammed down over dissenting secured financial creditors76. 
Second, article 71 bis.2 of the SBA is concerned with out-of-court workouts that still earn claw-back 
protection even though the majority of article 71 bis.1 of the SBA (60 percent of the claims) cannot be 
reached. However, certain requisites set forth in article 71 bis.2 of the SBA ought to be clearer77
                                                        
76 Unsecured creditors’ financial claims may be also crammed down with a majority of 60 percent or 75 percent of the 
financial claims. See footnote 13. 
. 
Third, article 93.2.2º of the SBA contemplates a rebuttable presumption according to which creditors 
entering into a Legally Enhanced Workout shall not be held de facto directors. Fourth, new money 
granted by creditors becoming shareholders as a result of a debt-for-equity swap as a result of a 
Legally Enhanced Workout shall not be subordinated. In addition, the reform grants a whole 
 
77 See footnote 13. The Royal Decree-law 4/2014 was confirmed by the Spanish legislature on March 20, 2014. Besides, 
this reform is going to give rise to a new law, which may introduce some amendments on the current draft. Hopefully 
these amendments may clarify some points of the reform. In any event, the interviewees did not take account of this 
reform. 
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administrative expense preference to the new money stemming from a Legally Enhanced Workout 
for two years (until March 7, 2016), notwithstanding whether the lender is a debtor’s especially 
related person. Fifth, the reform sort of acknowledges that insolvency might prompt that unsecured 
creditors become the new residual claimants or, at least, the holders of the residual decision rights78. 
Directors and shareholders are incentivized to foster a debt-for-equity swap stemming from a 
Legally Enhanced Workout if an independent expert considers it to be reasonable to handle financial 
distress79
 
. Lastly, article 172 bis of the SBA eases the liability for the impaired claims by establishing a 
more demanding adequate causation requirement. 
Concerning inconveniences, public claims are not bound by the automatic stay (unlike suppliers 
―see article 5 bis of the SBA―). Nor are the commercial and the public claims affected by the 
cramdown provisions of the additional section fourth of the SBA. In addition, the automatic stay 
does not embrace setoff or certain declaratory relief. Most importantly, the reform has concentrated 
even more the legal incentives on the Legally Enhanced Workouts. First, debtors negotiating an 
unprotected out-of-court workout may not file a communication to suspend their duty to petition 
bankruptcy and to forestall non-voluntary petitions for four months. The law seems to take for 
granted that no sensible stakeholder would turn to an unprotected workout, regardless of whether or 
not it may be as efficient as a Legally Enhanced Workout in order to handle corporate insolvency. 
Second, protection against claw-back and the prepetition new money incentives also remain within 
the realm of the Legally Enhanced Workouts. It is hard to tell the economic grounds that may explain 
why certain new money is better than other. Third, the safe harbor provision under article 93.2.2 of 
the SBA regarding lender liability akin to de facto direction does not apply to creditors entering into 
an unprotected out-of-court workout. All in all, this safe harbor provision only confirms that anyone 
seeking creditors to be held de facto directors bears the corresponding burden of proof. Fourth, the 
promotion of the debt-for-equity swaps should not depend upon the conclusion of a Legally 
Enhanced Workout or an unprotected out-of-court workout. Last but not least, the reform fosters the 
cramdown of out-of-court workouts far beyond the scope of a composition agreement in bankruptcy 
(particularly as to the treatment of secured claims).  
 
Be that as it may, the goal of the reform seems to consist of promoting negotiated out-of-court 
alternatives as the main solution to remove corporate insolvency, characterizing bankruptcy as a 
residual venue for liquidation (preferably through the sale of the business unit as a going-concern). 
 
  
                                                        
78 See footnote 22.  
79 Otherwise the directors and even the shareholders may be charged with a rebuttable presumption of willfully or 
grossly negligently generating or aggravating insolvency (see article 165.4º of the SBA), which may wind-up in 
liability for the impaired claims if bankruptcy is classified as guilty (see article 172 bis of the SBA). 
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4. Conclusions 
 
Bankruptcy is still compulsory to handle corporate insolvency under Spanish law. In fact, however, it 
is the residual option for the majority of going-concern companies, which draw on “unprotected” 
out-of-court workouts increasingly at the expense of the legal incentives of the Legally Enhanced 
Workouts. The interviews conducted with practitioners have offered certain hints to explain this 
phenomenon. The absence of new security interests or “fresh money” would make the Legally 
Enhanced Workouts more expensive than “unprotected” out-of-court workouts in relative terms. 
The concerns about the “legal shield” and the case law’s shift towards the “unjustified estate’s 
prejudice” doctrine may also contribute to understanding the loss of the Legally Enhanced 
Workouts’ comparative advantage. All in all, the Legally Enhanced Workouts still seem to be “a 
must” from a qualitative point of view. In addition, the suspicion that may loom over “unsecured” 
out-of-court workouts in light of the remaining accounting incentives that might lead to banks’ 
strategic behavior could also increase their appeal. Further empirical research work should analyze 
the evolution of the statistics once the SBA’s brand-new reforms of 2013 and 2014 have settled among 
the legal actors. 
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